Besides,
those who live in one general community, and have all things in
common, oftener dispute with each other than those who have their
property separate; from the very small number indeed of those who have
their property in common, compared with those where it is
appropriated, the instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also
but right to mention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved
from who live in a communion of goods, but also the advantages they
are deprived of; for when the whole comes to be considered, this
manner of life will be found impracticable.
We must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the
principle he set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a
family and a city ought to be one in some particulars, but not
entirely; for there is a point beyond which if a city proceeds in
reducing itself to one, it will be no longer a city.
There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a
city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be
worse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who
sing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to
be made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education; as
property at Lacedsemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made
common by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any
education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and
respectable, will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such
regulations, and not by manners, philosophy, and laws.
Pages:
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69