An oligarchy is
liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because
through a distrust in the citizens the government is obliged to employ
mercenary troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army
will very often assume the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and
if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably
establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear of this, they are
forced to let the people in general have some share in the government,
because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of
confidence in each other, they will entrust the guardianship of the
state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between
them, and sometimes become master of both, which happened at Larissa,
when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power. The same thing
happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, of which
Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy from
one party's overbearing and insulting another, or from their
quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their marriages,
for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: and in
Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the same
account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person
being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's
being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion
suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was
that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have
them publicly bound in the pillory.
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