That music should be pursued, not on this account
only, but also as it is very serviceable during the hours of
relaxation from labour, probably no [1340a] one doubts; we should also
inquire whether besides this use it may not also have another of
nobler nature--and we ought not only to partake of the common pleasure
arising from it (which all have the sensation of, for music naturally
gives pleasure, therefore the use of it is agreeable to all ages and
all dispositions); but also to examine if it tends anything to improve
our manners and our souls. And this will be easily known if we feel
our dispositions any way influenced thereby; and that they are so is
evident from many other instances, as well as the music at the Olympic
games; and this confessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm; but
enthusiasm is an affection of the soul which strongly agitates the
disposition. Besides, all those who hear any imitations sympathise
therewith; and this when they are conveyed even without rhythm or
verse. Moreover, as music is one of those things which are pleasant,
and as virtue itself consists in rightly enjoying, loving, and hating,
it is evident that we ought not to learn or accustom ourselves to
anything so much as to judge right and rejoice in honourable manners
and noble actions. But anger and mildness, courage and modesty, and
their contraries, as well as all other dispositions of the mind, are
most naturally imitated by music and poetry; which is plain by
experience, for when we hear these our very soul is altered; and he
who is affected either with joy or grief by the imitation of any
objects, is in very nearly the same situation as if he was affected by
the objects themselves; thus, if any person is pleased with seeing a
statue of any one on no other account but its beauty, it is evident
that the sight of the original from whence it was taken would also be
pleasing; now it happens in the other senses there is no imitation of
manners; that is to say, in the touch and the taste; in the objects of
sight, a very little; for these are merely representations of things,
and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common to all.
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